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Introduction 
 
Recently, two papers were published in this journal that address some fundamental ethical issues 
raised by closed-loop brain devices (CBDs) in healthcare.1 As Gilbert, O’Brien and Cook notice, 
research involving CBDs – both detecting neurological patterns and delivering stimulation to 
avoid or diminish the effects of an unwanted neuronal event – constitute an important line of 
research in the field of brain-computer interfaces.2 Contrary to brain stimulation through open-
loop devices, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), 
CBDs adapt to brain activity and provide a stimulation accordingly. A computer system registers 
brain activity and, if necessary, creates output that controls brain stimulation. Hence, such a 
CBD registers and intervenes ‘autonomously’ in the subject’s brain processes.3 Possible fields of 
CBD application concern the treatment of neurological patients, suffering from Parkinson disease 
and epilepsy. In the latter case, the device may register activity that is indicative of an upcoming 
seizure and, in response, may start stimulating a certain brain area in order to avoid an actual 
seizure.  
 The present debate on CBDs focuses on their use in such medical applications; possible 
criminal justice applications have not received scholarly attention. By contrast, the applications 
of other neurotechnologies that register or intervene in a person’s brain processes are being 
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discussed in the context of criminal justice. For example, the promises and perils of registering 
brain activity of convicted offenders through neuroimaging technologies, such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for instance to yield information regarding recidivism risks,4 
are currently under debate.5 Because the aim of such applications is to ‘read’ information out of 
the brain, which enables drawing inferences about particular mental states, they are sometimes 
referred to as ‘brain-reading’. Similarly, the permissibility of deploying ‘brain interventions’ in 
convicted offenders, such as pharmaceuticals and (non-)invasive brain stimulation, aiming to 
enhance particular brain processes and preventing reoffending, has been subjected to an extensive 
ethical debate.6 Apart from being discussed in the literature, both brain-reading and brain 
interventions have actually been employed in criminal justice settings, for example to obtain brain 
data in the context of the insanity defence (fMRI),7 or to prevent recidivism among sex offenders 
(chemical castration).8 Whereas both debates on registering and intervening with brain processes 
in the context of criminal justice are usually conducted separately, the development of CBDs 
makes it important to consider registration and intervention together. This is especially the case 
as the combination of these technologies in a closed-loop brain device entails further ethical but 
also legal intricacies, for example, concerning the user’s autonomy. 
At least in theory, it would be possible to deploy CBDs in criminal justice, and, more 
specifically, in the rehabilitation of convicted offenders, similarly to the much-debated possibility 
of employing brain interventions in this context. As Frederic Gilbert notes with regards to 
‘predictive brain implants’, they  
 
could in theory be utilized for treating a limited number of other brain disturbances where 
evidence shows that neuronal changes happen prior to symptoms occurring. As an 
illustration of how brain activity could be detected and stopped before manifesting itself, 
we can think of certain forms of aggressive and violent behaviors working in a similar 
manner to the onset of epilepsy, in particular temporal or frontal lobe seizures, as well 
impulsive sexual urges.9 
 
Arguably, aggressive and sexual impulses are the most important ones to diminish from a criminal 
law point of view. In general, CBDs are likely to be most helpful for disturbances that are not 
always present, but come and go. This is, generally, true for impulse control disorders, which can, 
but need not be related to aggression and sex. Other types of impulse-control related behaviours 
that are relevant for criminal law are pyromania and kleptomania.  
Contrary to medicine, in criminal justice, CBDs might be offered on behalf of the State 
for safety reasons, instead of the aim of healthcare. Notably, although such use of CBDs is in 
principle consensual – the offender has a choice to either accept or decline the offer – the context 
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of criminal justice and the type of choice the offender is confronted with (for instance: parole in 
exchange for CBD use) are different from CBD use in healthcare. Obviously, such employment of 
CBDs in criminal justice raises additional fundamental ethical and legal questions – even when 
CBDs might be non-invasive. In this paper, we consecutively address the following three issues: 
autonomy, human rights and accountability. The legal context for our analysis of human rights 
is provided by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Throughout, we assume that 
one purpose of CBDs used in criminal justice settings would be to prevent an offender from 
recidivating (‘correctional CBDs’), though we leave it open whether this goal would be sought for 
the benefit of the offender, the benefit of others, or both.  
 
Autonomy  
 
As noted in the introduction, the current debate on CBDs focuses on the use of these technologies 
in a medical context. However, the discussion on healthcare CBDs and autonomy is also relevant 
to the context of offender rehabilitation.  
 As to autonomy, the present debate distinguishes between healthcare CBDs that operate 
completely independent of the patient’s will, entirely taking the patient out of the decisional loop, 
and CBDs that provide patients with feedback and give them some control over the system, 
keeping them in the decisional loop.10 Whereas the out-of-the-loop-patient has no control over 
decisions on whether and how to react in response to particular neuronal events – ‘outsourcing’ 
those decision-making tasks to the CBD’s algorithms –, it has well been argued that the in-the-
loop-subject retains significant autonomy over decision-making.11 Moreover, some have suggested 
that CBDs that keep the patient in the decisional loop, providing assistive guidance in choosing 
how to act and (thus) enlarging one’s range of choice, can be interpreted by the patient as an 
integral component of his increased degree of control, which leads to his (increased) sense of 
autonomy.12 At the same time, over-relying on the information provided by the CBD might de 
facto also result in outsourcing the patient’s decision-making, adversely affecting one’s autonomy.13 
Of note, whether outsourcing decision-making tasks does indeed necessarily diminishes autonomy, 
is open for debate.14  
The impact on autonomy, we argue, will also depend on our understanding of the concept. 
If autonomy is conceptualised as the absence of certain forms of interference or of control by 
others or by algorithms,15 any CBD in criminal justice, deployed on behalf of the State would 
probably diminish autonomy. The reason is that the device is able to interfere with or to 
circumvent a person's own decision-making. 
But there are other ways of interpreting autonomy. For instance, if autonomy consists in 
having control over one’s own life, then whether CBD – either consensual or non-consensual – 
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decreases autonomy will depend on whether the mental states suppressed by the device are 
themselves states that interfere with one’s control over one’s life.  For example, suppose the 
rehabilitation of an offender has failed several times because of behavioural patterns that he 
apparently cannot shake off – much to the offender's own regret. In this way, he will never be 
able to build the life in the community he desires. If a correctional CBD targets those mental/brain 
states that undermine the offender’s rehabilitation, the CBD might be considered to empower the 
offender, increasing his autonomy, at least in the sense of having control over one's life. While the 
first view of autonomy focuses on the relationship between other agents and one’s individual 
decisions, the second view looks at the autonomous life from the inside, focussing on an individual’s 
internal capacities and powers.  
Such a positive effect on autonomy – in the sense of controlling one’s life – might be 
stronger for the in-the-loop-subject compared to the out-the-loop-subject. After all, apart from 
contributing to supressing autonomy-undermining mental states, in-the-loop-CBDs could provide 
the individual with options he would not otherwise had had, such as the opportunity to extinguish 
an impending urge.16 One could imagine a process where the offender gets more and more in the 
loop during the process. The more robust and successful the rehabilitative steps, the more an 
offender can take matters in his own hand. Gradually, the offender enters the loop. Of note, he is 
only out of the loop regarding a very limited type of behavioural choices, namely the choices that 
potentially – yet profoundly – interfere with his aim: successful re-entering society. 
In discussing the issue of autonomy, the question arises whether the impact of correctional 
CBDs would be different compared to other brain interventions, such as pharmaceuticals and 
deep brain stimulation. For example, take the case of an offender suffering from a sexual disorder, 
who has been convicted for sexual assault. Would the impact on the offender’s autonomy be 
different if the judge imposes correctional CBD compared to chemical castration, both targeting 
the offender’s sexual arousal? If autonomy consists in controlling one’s own life, the answer to this 
question would probably depend on whether the offender is in, or out of the decisional loop. If the 
latter, the CBD controls the offender’s mental states similar to chemical castration: both targeting 
sexual arousal while completely bypassing the offender’s will. By contrast, if the CBD keeps the 
offender in the decisional loop, the offender keeps at least some ultimate control over whether and 
how to react in response to the identified neuronal event.  
If autonomy is equated (in part) with the absence of certain forms of interference or control 
by others, correctional CBDs will, in general, probably have a limited negative effect on autonomy 
compared to other brain interventions. This is because CBD’s are smart in the sense that they 
interfere with the subject’s mental states only at particular times, when it is necessary to avoid 
or diminish the effects of an unwanted neuronal event. For example, in the case of the sexual 
offender, a CBD may only provide stimulation if it identifies (brain correlates of) sexual arousal. 
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By contrast, chemical castration delimits sexual arousal 24/7, constantly controlling the offender’s 
hormones and exposing him to various side-effects. Similarly, deep brain stimulation constantly 
stimulates the brain area at issue. Hence, compared to such more traditional brain interventions, 
CBDs enable to interfere with the offender’s mental states more subtly and focused; only when 
controlling a specific neuronal event is necessary. In our view, this should be a relevant 
consideration in discussing the possibilities and perils of CBDs and other brain interventions for 
the rehabilitation of criminal offenders.  
 
Human Rights  
 
In view of the advances in neurotechnology and the possibilities it offers both for the registering 
of, and intervening with particular brain processes, some ethicists have argued to explicitly 
recognise the notion of novel rights over the mind, such as rights to mental integrity, cognitive 
liberty, mental self-determination and mental privacy.17 At the same time, others have argued 
that, at least in the European context, legal protection against brain-reading and brain 
intervention is already enshrined in the current framework of human rights, most prominently 
under the right to freedom of thought and the right to respect for private life.18 In what follows, 
we briefly discuss these rights, and explore their possible implications for CBDs deployed in order 
to prevent an offender from recidivating (correctional CBDs). 
 
Freedom of thought 
According to Article 9 ECHR, everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, including the freedom to change and manifest one’s religion or belief, for example, through 
engaging in religious practices. This right comprises an internal and external dimension. Whereas 
the freedom of thought, conscience and religion concerns the internal dimension, the right to 
manifest one’s religion and belief comprises the external dimension.5  
While the external dimension is relative (it can be restricted in specific circumstances), 
the internal dimension of freedom of thought is absolute, in that it may never be lawfully infringed. 
The absolute internal dimension guarantees that the State may never interfere with the most 
intimate and inner sphere of its citizens, neither by imposing coercive measures to make a person 
change what he believes, nor by using inquisitorial methods to discover one’s personal thoughts 
and convictions.19 As the ‘founding fathers’ of Article 9 ECHR put it, the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion intends to protect “not only from ‘confessions’ imposed for 
 
5 Note that Article 9 ECHR does not cover the manifestation of thoughts. Yet, thoughts can be 
‘manifested’ through actions, e.g., via speech and expression, covered by the freedom of expression 
pursuant to Article 10 ECHR. 
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reasons of State, but also from those abominable methods of police enquiry or judicial process 
which rob the suspect or accused person of control of his intellectual faculties and of his 
conscience.”20 
At first glance, freedom of thought, protecting from registering and controlling of thoughts, 
seems to offer clear legal protection with regard to CBDs – both registering and controlling 
particular brain processes of the individual. However, since the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights (the Court) held that “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion denotes only those views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance”21, it is not clear at all that the data CBDs register, and the brain processes they (aim 
to) control, constitute ‘thoughts’ in the meaning of Article 9 ECHR. Presumably, this will depend 
on the precise details of the application. For example, do emotions qualify as ‘thoughts’ under the 
Court’s present approach?22 As Evans notes, the right to freedom of thought and conscience 
basically comprises personal thoughts on political, philosophical, ethical and intellectual positions 
in human affairs.23 Whereas correctional CBDs may well register and control ‘important’ mental 
states, like an upcoming epileptic seizure or (potentially) sexual arousal, it is less clear whether 
such mental states should be considered as attaining ‘a certain level of cogency, seriousness and 
cohesion’, similarly to, e.g., political preferences and philosophical positions. Hence, whether a 
correctional CBD falls within the scope of the absolute right to freedom of thought, is yet an open 
question.  
In order to guarantee fundamental legal protection from novel technologies that register 
and intervene in brain processes, some have argued that the scope of freedom of thought ought to 
be broadened so as to cover any mental state that has ‘content or meaning’.24 At the same time, 
as Christoph Bublitz argues, in some cases good reasons can exist to control or disclose particular 
mental states of an individual. For example, (non-consensual) psychiatric interventions in order 
to change the patient’s mental states, e.g. in the context of suicidal depression, are sometimes 
necessary to protect the wellbeing of the patient. In addition, individuals may have legal duties 
to speak and disclose particular mental states, for instance as a witness in court.25 Hence, some 
suggest that there is a need to reconsider the absolute nature of freedom of thought, and develop 
some (narrow) exceptions that might justify the registering and controlling of mental states.26 
 
Freedom of expression 
However, whereas revising freedom of thought may ensure fundamental legal protection regarding 
correctional CBDs, it could well be the case that, at present, other fundamental rights already 
offer legal protection in this respect. For example, Article 10 ECHR guarantees freedom of 
expression, including the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and 
ideas without interference by public authority.” Interestingly, Article 10 ECHR has been 
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understood to include a right not to convey opinions, ideas and other information.27 Whereas 
freedom of thought only protects particular mental states, attaining a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion, and importance, the scope of freedom of (non)expression is considered 
“extremely broad”,28 encompassing not only the substance of (almost any) information and idea, 
but also protecting “a diverse variety of forms and means in which they are manifested, 
transmitted, and received.”29  
Still, whether registering and controlling the manifestation of, e.g., sexual arousal with 
CBDs would fall within the scope of this right remains unclear, because it is not clear that the 
signals sent to the CBD would count as ‘expression’, nor that the CBD’s intervention affects 
‘opinions’ or ‘ideas’ in de meaning of Article 10 ECHR. However, prior to revising fundamental 
rights such as the right to freedom of thought, an in-depth examination of the legal implications 
of (among other things) correctional CBDs in light of existing fundamental rights is desirable.  
Whereas it is yet to be examined whether the employment of correctional CBDs falls 
within the scope of the right to freedom of thought and of (non)expression, it is clear that the 
generic right to respect for private life offers (at least some) protection is this respect, which is 
discussed below. 
 
The right to respect for private life 
Under Article 8(1) ECHR, everyone has the right to respect for his private life. According to the 
Court, the notion of ‘private life’ in this context is a broad concept that does not lend itself to an 
exhaustive definition.30 Therefore, and since the Court approaches the ECHR as a living 
instrument that should be interpreted in light of present-day conditions,31 the scope of the right 
to respect for private life is constantly evolving, for example in the light of technological and 
ethical developments. Notwithstanding difficulties defining ‘private life’, it is clear that it covers 
inter alia the individual’s (1) personal data, (2) bodily integrity and (3) psychological and moral 
integrity.32  
Since CBDs register information from the brain of the individual, for example regarding a 
psychiatric disorder or sexual arousal, such devices register information ‘relating to an identified 
or identifiable individual’ – that is, they process (sensitive) personal data. The collection, storage 
and disclosure of such data without consent infringes the right to respect for private life, as will 
its use, e.g., in a legal procedure.33 Whether the processing of personal data through correctional 
CBDs qualifies as ‘collecting, storing and/or disclosing’ personal information, will probably depend 
on whether the data will become available for a third party (for example, the probation officer) – 
that is, whether the information is ‘extracted’ from the CBD user. After all, if the CBD only 
moves brain data from one ‘part of the brain’ to another, it seems not to interfere with any 
considerable personal data interest of its user. 
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Obviously, if a CBD is placed within the brain of the subject through brain surgery, it 
infringes the individual’s bodily integrity. But even if a CBD could be employed without such 
bodily intrusion, registering and controlling brain processes from outside the skull, the fact that 
it aims to intervene in and/or change physical reactions in the brain, would presumably constitute 
an interference with the individual’s bodily integrity as well, infringing the right to respect for 
private life.34  
As to physiological and moral integrity, the precise meaning and scope of these notions 
are unclear. Although the Court indicates that both ‘moral’ and ‘psychological’ integrity are 
interchangeable terms, it refrains from providing a precise definition.35 What is clear though, is 
that a person’s mental health is a crucial part of private life associated with the aspect of moral 
integrity.36 Furthermore, together with bodily integrity, the individual’s psychological integrity 
comprises “multiple aspects of the person’s identity such as, for example, gender identification, 
sexual orientation, name and elements relating to a person’s right to his or her image.”37 Deploying 
CBDs to ‘enhance’ the brains of convicted offenders by intervening with particular mental states 
has the potential to affect the subject’s mental health. Hence, it might not be unreasonable to 
assume that the Court would be inclined to consider such correctional CBDs as interfering with 
moral integrity, thus (again) infringing the right to private life. In addition, one could raise the 
question of whether imposing a CBD upon an individual, influencing his brain processes, interferes 
with the individual’s (narrative) identity.38 
Note, however, that infringements of the right to private life do not necessarily imply a 
violation of this right. Instead, an infringement with the rights guaranteed by Article 8(1) ECHR 
can be justified if it complies with the requirements of Article 8(2) ECHR – that is, if it is in 
accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the legitimate interest of, inter 
alia, the prevention of crime. Although this justification clause is often considered to be broad, 
potentially justifying a wide range of infringements, it is not clear at all that correctional CBDs 
would be permissible. For example, in assessing whether an infringement with Article 8 ECHR is 
necessary for the prevention of crime, the Court inter alia takes into account whether the case 
raises sensitive moral or ethical issues: if that is the case, the level of discretion (‘margin of 
appreciation’) afforded to the Member States to balance the competing interests at stake, tends 
to be broader.39 Hence, if CBDs enter the domain of criminal justice, the law, possibly informed 
by ethics, should develop a normative approach under Article 8 ECHR, tailored to the 
particularities of CBDs. 
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Accountability 
 
When human subjects and (semi)autonomous systems intertwine with each other, we must 
consider how to approach moral and legal accountability.40 As to brain interventions, such as 
pharmaceuticals and deep brain stimulation, the issue of accountability has gained considerable 
scholarly attention.41 In this regard, the main question in the moral-philosophical and legal 
literature focusses on whether and, if so, to which extent an individual can be held morally and 
legally accountable for actions that follow from the modification of one’s brain. For example, 
whereas P used to be a law-abiding citizen before his brain-intervention, thereafter and as a result 
thereof, P has turned into a violent, strongly pleasure-seeking person. Acting from these traits, P 
rapes X. To what extent can P be held morally and legally accountable for his actions?  
In the present paper, we do not discuss this particular question (stemming from the 
healthcare context). Instead, we explore how the employment of correctional CBDs sheds new 
light on the present debate on accountability for actions that (partially) result from brain 
intervention. We focus on the following question, as was raised by Kellmeyer et al. regarding 
CBD-treatment of epilepsy:  
 
What if a medical device fails to predict and interrupt an epileptic seizure, which results 
in the subject being in an unsafe environment, leading to her injury and/or the injuries of 
others? Who will be taken to court—the subject, the programmer, or the device 
company?42 
 
Imagine, for example, the case of P, who is convicted for sexual child abuse. In the context of his 
conviction, the judge offered a CBD, registering P’s sexual arousal and, if necessary, automatically 
intervening to suppress it. The CBD initially works well, however, after four years of being a 
‘perfect’ citizen, P reoffends: while he is waiting in the queue to pay for his groceries, a system 
error occurs. The CBD fails to register P’s sexual arousal and (thus) does not intervene, from 
which arousal P subsequently touches a child.  
To what extent is P criminally accountable for his action? The answer to this question 
may well vary depending on whether the approach is legal or moral-philosophical.43 Yet, in what 
follows, we discuss three issues that we believe would be relevant under both a legal and moral-
philosophical approach – that is, whether (I) the system failure could be qualified as a ‘mental 
impairment’, (II) the CBD operates through keeping the subject in or out the loop, and (III) the 
CBD is self-learning.  
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I. Mental impairment 
Both in criminal law and philosophy, it is arguably accepted that under certain circumstances, a 
mental impairment at the time of the offence can diminish responsibility or (completely) excuse 
an offender for his actions, through the insanity defence.44 Although the precise requirements vary 
across different states, many jurisdictions recognise some form of the insanity defence.45 For 
example, in England, according to the M’Nagthen Rules a defendant will not be held criminally 
responsible if, “at the time of the committing of the act, he was labouring under such a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; 
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” Meanwhile, in the 
USA, according to the Model Penal Code Test, one “is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either 
to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.”  
As to the case of P, whose criminal offence resulted from a defect in his CBD, the question 
arises whether such a system error could, or should be qualified as a disease of the mind (‘mental 
impairment’) in the meaning of the insanity defence. If so, P could potentially be (partly) excused 
for his actions – depending on the precise requirements of the insanity defence at issue.  
A simple argument in favour of exculpation or diminished responsibility could appeal to 
the fact that the malfunction of the CBD diminishes P’s ability to control his sexual arousal, and 
thus to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, compared to the prior situation, in 
which the CBD was functioning normally.  
However, to counter this argument, one could argue that, during the time that the CBD 
was functioning normally, P enjoyed enhanced capacity to control his arousal. Thus, it may be 
that the malfunction merely takes him back to his pre-CBD level of capacity, which may have 
been sufficient for full accountability. If P’s control over his conduct was impaired before 
employing the CBD, a subsequent system failure will bring P back in his original state of mental 
impairment. In that case, it is not the error itself that should qualify as mental impairment, but 
rather P’s own authentic (impaired) mental state. In such cases, exculpation through the insanity 
defence will still be possible if, as a result of the impaired original mental state, the subject, for 
example, lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law. In cases like that, the system failure itself is not significant. 
Instead, a causal relationship should be determined between the individual’s action on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, his (own) mental impairment.  
However, one could argue that if the CBD user reasonably relies on the CBD, and then 
all of a sudden it stops working, the user effectively has a new impairment that he did not have 
to begin with: an inability to know in advance how the CBD, and thus his own mind, is going to 
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behave. This would make it more difficult for the individual to control his conduct compared to 
a situation he had no CBD at all: not only is his control reduced by the loss of the control-
enhancing effect of the CBD, it is also reduced by his inability to predict his own mental responses. 
But what if the system failure does not merely result in the CBD not working, but the 
device malfunctions in a way resulting in erratic brain stimulation, from which stimulation the 
subject causes harm to another? The situation would arguably be similar to one in which a person 
suddenly starts to suffer from epilepsy, as a result of which a part of his brain becomes overactive 
and causes involuntary movements from time to time.  In such a case, the system failure itself 
does cause a disturbance of the subject’s mental state. Hence, it would be less problematic to 
argue that such an error should qualify as mental impairment that diminishes or negates the 
subject’s accountability.  
As the above discussion illustrates, determining whether there is a mental impairment of 
a sort that might undermine accountability will be a complex matter in cases of a malfunctioning 
CBD. It will depend, among other things, on (i) the individual’s level of capacity before receiving 
the CBD, (ii) the degree to which the CBD enhances capacity, and (iii) whether the malfunction 
of the CBD introduces a new incapacity or merely removes the enhancement of capacity that it 
provided 
 
II. In or out the loop 
As discussed in section 2, the in-the-loop-subject may have increased autonomy compared to the 
out-of-the-loop-subject. As a consequence, Kellmeyer et al. notice, the in-the-loop-subject has 
increased accountability as well.46 As they argue: 
 
The out-of-the-loop subject has some responsibility for consenting to the consequences of 
the implanted system but is not accountable for the consequences of any particular seizure. 
If, on the other hand, the subject remains in the loop (e.g., via a visual feedback system), 
the subject’s failure to modify her behavior in accordance with the indicated level of risk 
may indeed result in moral and legal accountability. 
 
First, as to the out-of-the-loop-subject, in the context of criminal justice, where a CBD might be 
imposed upon the convicted offender, accountability for consenting to the potential consequences 
of the CBD is not relevant.6 This could be different if a CBD is not imposed on behalf of the 
State, but offered to the offender as an alternative to, for example, prison, or without formal 
 
6 In addition, it is debatable whether any system failure will be foreseeable, and (thus) whether the 
subject can be considered to have consented to such a failure.  
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strings attached. However, even then, questions could be raised regarding whether an offender is 
accountable for any consequences of the CBD, since the offender may have agreed to undergo it 
only out of desperation to avoid further prison time. (Even if there is no formal link made between 
agreement to undergo the CBD and early release, the offender may know that agreeing to receive 
the intervention is likely to lower the risk he is deemed to pose and may therefore be helpful in 
securing release, for example, via parole.) 
 Second, in light of the in-the-loop-subject’s increased autonomy,7 any failure of the subject 
to modify his behaviour in accordance with the communicated output of the CBD, resulting in 
harm to others, might indeed not justify exculpation. After all, within his increased autonomy, 
the subject should be held accountable for his decision to ignore the communicated output. 
However, what if it is not the subject, but the CBD that fails, by not registering the relevant 
brain process and, subsequently, not providing (the right) output to the subject? Could the in-
the-loop-subject’s autonomy still be considered to be increased in such cases and, if so, should this 
lead to (or increase) his accountability for not acting differently? In our view, if the user might 
reasonably rely on the CBD, it would not be unreasonable to argue that any unforeseeable 
technological failure resulting in a criminal offence should reduce accountability.  
In addition, if the CBD fails to provide the in-the-loop-subject with information to act 
upon, the question arises whether that subject should still be treated differently in terms of 
accountability compared to the out-of-the-loop-subject. After all, both subjects are not in the loop 
(anymore), either because one has never been in the loop, or because the loop is discontinued by 
the occurred error.  
 
III. Self-learning technology 
Finally, whether and, if so, who should be accountable for actions that follow from a CBD system 
failure may also depend on whether the CBD is self-learning. This is especially relevant (also in a 
broader context) in this artificial-intelligence-era in which many machines are artificial intelligence 
(AI) driven and have self-learning capacities. The following example – with regard to robots – 
may help to illustrate this. 
Suppose that a robot wrongfully identifies a human being (X) as a threat to his objective. 
Somehow it ‘thinks’ X is in its way. Because this robot is smart, self-learning, and self-deciding, 
it calculates the most efficient way to eliminate the threat. So the robot decides to use its hydraulic 
arm to push X into an adjacent machine. This machine is heavy industrial machinery, thus killing 
X instantly. This prompts the question: who is to blame? We are not dealing with a merely 
 
7 Because the CBD then provides the subject as much information as possible about one’s brain processes, 
enhancing his ability to control one’s own behaviour. 
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hypothetical situation here. It actually happened in Japan and this is only one of many examples 
that show the dangers of AI.47 
The ability of an AI-entity to act is brought about by its capability to gain experiences 
and to learn from them.48 This feature makes AI-entities interesting for many authorities. But the 
example of the robot illustrates the perils of employing self-learning technology in daily life. CBDs 
both detect neurological patterns and deliver stimulation to avoid or diminish the effects of an 
unwanted neuronal event by adapting to brain activity and providing a stimulation accordingly. 
If CBDs are self-learning, the issue of foreseeability becomes even more complicated. After all, the 
specific way in which such CBDs might adapt, and learn to better adapt to brain activity will by 
definition not be (completely) foreseeable, not even to the institution that created the device. In 
this regard, it should be borne in mind that the Member States of the ECHR have the positive 
obligation to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not 
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered 
by private individuals.49 Therefore, the judiciary can only deploy CBDs if they have no reason to 
distrust the reliability of these devices. This calls for a critical assessment of their reliability, the 
more so if CBDs are self-learning. 
Harmful actions (defined as criminal offences in a Criminal Code) that are ‘committed’ by 
AI-entities, which have been triggered by (the failure) of self-learning devices, may need to be 
imputed to a legal and/or natural person. In order to impute the action of person A to person B, 
it should be established that B had the power to control whether this action (or similar actions) 
would actually take place, and that B accepted this action (or similar actions).50 This twofold 
criterion requires foreseeability of A’s actions in order to establish criminal liability with regard 
to B. As such, the criterion functions adequately in the ‘classical’ legal domain in which actions 
of (natural or legal) person A are imputed to (natural or legal) person B. However, it is uncertain 
whether foreseeability and control can be established in case of self-learning and self-deciding 
machines. 
In addition, in order to be punishable a criminal offence must be committed intentionally 
or be the consequence of negligence. If the CEO (C) of a company is aware of illegal behaviour of 
his employee D, but he does not take action to stop this behaviour, C can be held criminally liable 
for the offence, intentionally committed by D. In case of AI-driven technology, it is not certain – 
to say the least – whether a natural or legal person can be said to have acted intentionally or with 
negligence if the device (as a result of its self-learning abilities) acted in a way that could not 
reasonably have been foreseen. 
In short, if a (self-learning) CBD intervenes or omits to intervene in a way that has harmful 
consequences, it is not evident that the carrier of the CBD can be ‘automatically’ held criminally 
accountable for those consequences, especially in case of an out-of-the-loop-CBD. The same can 
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be said with regard to the manufacturer of the CBD and the company providing for its software. 
The problem of the imputation of actions with harmful consequences to (other) persons therefore 
needs to be thought through in a very thorough manner. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Whereas the current debate on CBDs focuses on consensual employment in healthcare, we 
explored some ethical and legal issues regarding correctional CBDs. Similar to the much-debated 
brain-reading and brain altering techniques, correctional CBDs might potentially contribute to 
preventing crime, or more generally facilitating the rehabilitation of convicted offenders. Yet, such 
use of CBDs – even if this use would take place on a consensual basis – entails further ethical and 
legal intricacies, both compared to healthcare CBDs and neurotechnologies that either ‘read’ or 
intervene in the brain. Hence, anticipating technological developments, we argue that 
extrapolating the debate on CBDs to the context of criminal justice would be highly desirable. 
Not least because deploying neurotechnologies in criminal justice is no ‘neuroscience fiction’ 
anymore, and correctional CBDs might, in certain ways, be less intrusive than ‘traditional’ 
interventions, such as chemical castration and constant brain stimulation. In this paper, we 
identified some ethical and legal considerations that may be helpful in pursuing the debate on 
CBDs tailored to the context of criminal justice. 
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